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“I am so humble!”
on the paradoxes of humility
Brian Robinson
2.1 Introduction
Humility is a paradoxical virtue. This should come as no great surprise. It doesn’t 
take much explanation for one to realize that if someone is boasting about how 
humble he is, then he probably is not humble. In fact, as we shall see, the 
paradoxical nature of humility has a long history, going back to at least Thomas 
Aquinas in the thirteenth century. While it may not be a novel claim that there exists 
an apparent paradox of humility, I will argue that there is more than one humility 
paradox, perhaps as many as five: the epistemic paradox, the paradox of self-
attribution, the inculcation paradox, the agentic paradox, and the axiological 
paradox. All these paradoxes are distinct, yet seemingly intertwined. Upon 
examining them each in turn, we will be left with a Gordian knot of humility 
paradoxes. I will begin by discussing each paradox in turn.
To unravel this knot, it helps to consider what precisely humility is. In the 
past decade, a wellspring of new literature has emerged, offering new insight on this 
old virtue. Between older and more recent scholarship on this virtue, two differing
conceptions of humility arise. All of them agree that a central aspect of humility has 
to do with how one regards oneself. On the frst (and perhaps oldest) view, people’s 
humility is based on how they assess themselves. Here humility is about having a 
low self-assessment (either in general or in some particular domain), whereas pride 
is having a high self-assessment.Te second view of humility sees the trait as based 
not on how one views oneself, but how often one considers one’s merit, status, or 
accomplishments. A humble person is inattentive (rather than inaccurate) to one’s 
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status. I will argue that this second conception of humility is able to cut the Gordian 
knot of the paradoxes of humility.
2.2 Paradoxes
It is generally not debated that President Trump likes to brag. One of the most 
fascinating things he sometimes brags about is his own humility. For example, on 
CBS’s Face Te Nation he said, “I do have actually much more humility than a lot of 
people would think” (Dickerson, 2016). On his beloved medium of Twitter, he 
wrote, “Te new Pope is a humble man, very much like me, which probably explains 
why I like him so much!” (Trump, 2013).
Tere is something intuitively odd about these boasts. As Alfano and I 
argue, bragging is about trying to impress others with something about yourself 
(Alfano and Robinson, 2014). Humility, regardless of its precise nature, is
antithetical to trying to impress someone, either because you don’t regard yourself 
(or the relevant aspect of yourself ) as impressive, or because you are not attending 
to what is impressive about yourself. To humblebrag, as President Trump did in 
these comments, is to try to impress others with how much you don’t regard yourself 
as impressive.
Tis leads us to our frst paradox of humility, the self-attribution paradox of
humility. Consider again the utterance by speaker S,“I am so humble!” By producing 
this utterance, S has (typically) generated a paradox based on what S is attributing 
to herself. S is bragging. Yet, if she is in fact humble, it would seem that ipso facto
she would not brag. Hence, boasts about one’s own humility are ceteris paribus false.
By attributing humility to herself, S has indicated that she is not humble. Hume 
appears to recognize this problem when he states, “’Tis impossible a man can at the 
same time be both proud and humble” (Treatise 2.1.1).
Tis category of paradox is distinct then from paradoxes of self-reference 
(like the liar paradox) where the paradox is generated in part due to the sentence or 
utterance referring to itself. For example, “Tis sentence is false” is paradoxical 
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because the sentence refers to itself. In saying “I’m humble,” my utterance does not 
refer back to itself. Rather, I attribute a characteristic to myself that may be akin to 
a pragmatic contradiction (like saying, “I don’t exist”); if I truly possess that 
characteristic, I (typically)1 will not have made the utterance in question. In short,
we can put the paradox this way: typically, anyone who says they are humble is not,
and anyone who is humble will not say so.
Te second paradox is the epistemic paradox of humility. Let’s assume that 
knowledge is infallible: something must be true for us to know it. In that case, S 
cannot know that she is humble unless she is. Yet, if S is humble, then (typically) S 
cannot know that she is humble; her humility obscures this self-knowledge. Tis 
paradox has long been noticed, at least as far back as the sixteenth century, by the 
Catholic St. Teresa of Avila and the Protestant Martin Luther. Luther notes, “True 
humility, therefore never knows that it is humble … for if it knew this, it would turn 
proud from contemplation of so fne a virtue” (Luther, 1956, p. 375). Likewise, St. 
Teresa remarks that humility (and other virtues) “have the property of hiding 
themselves from one who possesses them, in such a way that he never sees them nor 
can believe that he has any of them, even if he be told so” (Avila, 1980, p. 77).
In addition to paradoxes regarding saying or knowing you are humble, there 
is a similar problem for becoming humble.Te Neo-Aristotelian standard account 
of how one develops a virtue is through habitation (Alfano, 2016, p. 118). As 
Aristotle puts it,
But the virtues we get by frst practicing them, as we do in the arts.
For it is by doing what we ought to do when we study the arts that 
we learn the arts themselves; we become builders by building and 
harpists by playing the harp. Similarly, it is by doing just act; that we 
1 There are special cases in which a humble person can be induced to utter, 
“I’m humble,” without producing a paradox of self-attribution. I will address these 
below. 
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become just, by doing temperate acts that we become temperate, by 
doing brave acts that we become brave.
(Nicomachean Ethics, book II.1)
Tis process of virtue inculcation through habituation requires intentionality. One 
must intentionally perform just acts in order to be come just. When it comes to 
humility, however, this process will not work. As Alfano and I argue elsewhere, one 
cannot intend to become humble (Robinson and Alfano, 2016, p. 439). A humble 
person typically does not brag, does not seek out praise from others, and demurs 
when praised. If one sought out praise in order to practice demurring (as a means 
of becoming humble), one has failed to be humble by seeking out praise from others 
in the frst place. Likewise, someone who intentionally does not brag (knowing she 
could, but choosing not to) has not performed a humble act, but rather 
demonstrated false modesty. Humility is not something you can attain by trying.
We can call this the inculcation paradox of humility.
So far, none of the paradoxes assume anything terribly controversial, I take 
it, and can be widely accepted. Not everyone, however, may be as willing to 
recognize the legitimacy of the next two humility paradoxes. Tey both make 
various philosophical assumptions that, while not outside the mainstream, are not 
universally endorsed by philosophers. Consider next the agentic paradox of 
humility. While there remains considerable debate in action theory, it is not 
uncommon to claim that an action must be intended by an agent in order to count 
as an action (Davidson, 1980). Te problem for humility is that (typically) one 
cannot intend to act humbly and then successfully do so. You may intend to act 
humbly, but whatever act you then perform will not be a humble act. Rather, such 
an action would demonstrate false modesty. For example, I have just praised you for 
a recent accomplishment. You now intend to act humbly by demurring and saying 
it was “No big deal,” and pointing out that it was not as noteworthy as someone 
else’s recent achievement. Based on that intention you act accordingly, but not 
humbly. You tried too hard, demurring not because you in fact are humble but for 
some other reason, such as conforming to social expectation.Tough more can be 
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said to fesh out this claim, all that is needed at present is to note that something 
certainly seems paradoxical here. Different views in action theory may work out the 
full details of this paradox differently, but some kind of paradox will emerge out of 
most accounts of actions.
Lastly, we have the axiological paradox of humility. Humility is often 
considered a virtue. Virtues are good character traits for a person. Yet humility—as 
the name implies—requires being humbled, i.e., being brought low, brought down 
a peg. Being humbled does not appear to be a good state for a person to be in.
Simply put interrogatively, how can it be good to be brought low? St. Aquinas noted 
this same problem with humility in the thirteenth century (Aquinas ST II-II, Q 
161, A 1).2 More recently, Baier makes the same point when she remarks, Humility 
as a virtue faces a paradox, namely that the very approval of it seems to threaten to 
destroy the thing approved. Pride in due pride presents no paradox, and neither does 
shame for shame, but pride in shame and shame for pride are at best unstable,
degenerate cases of refexivity (1991, p. 216).
Tese paradoxes are not, I think, intractable. I follow Burge in being guided 
by the assumption that the paradoxes are best approached as resources for 
understanding deep and subtle features of our language and concepts, rather than 
as symptoms of contradiction or incoherence in them. Insofar as the paradoxes are 
not resolved, they are symptoms of confusion or mistakes in our assumptions about 
our language and concepts (1984, p. 7).
2 I suspect that there may be a separate, sixth paradox regarding 
motivation, specifically regarding an apparent lack of motivation to be humble (or 
to be humbled, which appears to be necessary to be humble), even granting that 
humility is good or a virtue. This paradox would likely assume some form of 
motivational externalism. Attempts to formulate the paradox have so far, 
however, collapsed into standard problems with motivational externalism (and 
therefore are not problems unique to humility) or collapsed into one of the other 
five paradoxes. 
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2.3 Twotheories ofhumility
Unfortunately, our problems with humility do not end with these paradoxes.Tere 
is also a lack of consensus on the basic nature of humility. For many (if not most) 
virtues, there is general agreement as to what the virtue essentially amounts to.
Honesty is about telling the truth. Courage requires responding to danger or fear. 
Generosity involves giving to others.Tis is not to say that all the details are worked 
out, since they are not. How much and under what conditions truth telling, facing 
of danger, or giving to others are good and virtuous remain important open 
questions.Te point, however, is that for these virtues there is agreement on a basic 
conceptual framework, upon which we can have these more nuanced debates.Te 
same cannot be said for humility.Tough philosophers and theologians have long 
considered humility, there exists a wide range of views on the nature of this trait.
One of the earliest discussions of humility as a virtue outside of the New 
Testament comes in the epistle 1 Clement, which was likely composed toward the 
end of the frst century CE and has traditionally been attributed to Clement of 
Rome (Holmes, 2007, pp. 33–34), stating:
For Christ belongs to those who are humble-minded, not to those 
who vaunt themselves over the fock.Te scepter of God’s majesty,
the Lord Jesus Christ, did not come with an ostentatious show of 
arrogance or haughtiness—even though he could have done so—but 
with a humble mind, just as the Holy Spirit spoke concerning him.
(1 Clement 16.1–2)
While insufficient to extrapolate a theory of morality, Clement says enough for a 
few points to be noteworthy. First, humility isn’t mentioned per se, but being 
humble-minded appears to be a positive state or characteristic. Second, humility is 
in some way intellectual in nature, since Clement speaks of being “humble-minded.” 
Lastly, a clear contrast is drawn with the vice of arrogance. A few centuries later, St.
Augustine likewise lauded humility in several passages. While one may be able to 
reconstruct an Augustinian account of humility, doing so would require 
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considerable textual exegesis and theological discussion beyond the scope of this 
paper. Suffice it to say, Augustine also appears to regard humility as a virtue, though 
(at least to this author) how precisely Augustine defned humility remains unclear.
A clearer account emerges in Aquinas (though perhaps earlier) and up 
through the present day. I will now briefy review some of the ancient, modern, and 
contemporary views on humility. Tough we cannot here review in detail the 
historical development of theories of humility, the various accounts of humility can 
be, I think, grouped together into two general camps. In the rest of this section, I 
will canvas some of the views presented on humility, providing examples of thinkers 
in each group.Tis canvassing will by no means be an exhaustive account of all the 
philosophers and theologians to have discussed the virtue. Furthermore, by no 
means do I mean to suggest that there is unanimity regarding the nature of humility 
within these two groups; in fact, considerable debate continues within them to this 
day. Nevertheless, within each group there is consensus regarding the central aspect 
of what humility amounts to.
2.3.1 First theory: low self-assessment
Te frst, and perhaps oldest, theory of humility is that it primarily consists 
in accurately viewing oneself as lowly. Aquinas is one of the chief proponents of the
low self-assessment view of humility. He asserts, for example, that “humility, in so 
far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest 
place” (ST II-II, Q 161, A 1, ad. 2).To be humble, as Aquinas sees it, is to see oneself 
as low, base, beneath God, and other humans. Others are superior, either generally 
or in some specifc ways. Tis low self-assessment is not, however, some mere 
delusion. “It is possible, without falsehood” he contends, “to deem and avow oneself 
the most despicable of men … [and] avow and believe oneself in all ways 
unproftable and useless in respect of one’s own capability” (ST II-II, Q 161, A 6, ad.
1; emphasis mine). Te humble person correctly assesses her or his lowly status in 
relations to others.
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Not surprisingly, this view of humility is widespread and perhaps is the most 
common. Hume—though rejecting humility as one of the “monkish virtues” that 
“serve no purpose” (EPM 9.1)—is generally taken to regard humility in a similar 
manner, since he speaks of one’s idea of oneself as “dejected with humility” (Treatise
2.1.2) and appears to think humiliation is necessary for humility (c.f., Davie, 1999, 
p. 146).3 
Other contemporary theories limit the focus, shifting from one’s low status 
in general to something more specifc, such as one’s limitations. Snow, for example, 
takes this view, arguing,
To be a humble person is to recognize your limitations, to take them 
seriously, and thereby to foster a realism in attitudes and behavior 
regarding self and others. Humility can be defined as the disposition 
to allow the awareness of and concern about your limitations to have 
a realistic influence on your attitudes and behavior. At the heart of 
this realism is a perspective gained through accurate appraisal of 
your limitations and their implications for your circumstances,
attitudes, and behavior 
(Snow, 1995, p. 210).
Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr, and Howard-Snyder focus on intellectual humility
specifcally, which the regard as “proper attentiveness to, and owning of, one’s 
intellectual limitations” (2017, p. 12). Prima facie, these accounts of humility make
it look different than Aquinas’s or others in this group, since they do not require 
one to have a low self-assessment in comparison to someone or something else. For 
Aquinas, for instance, one should be humbled and humble before the greatness of 
God. For Whitcomb et al., however, the comparison is instead with some idealized 
version of oneself, one without the limitations one actually has. So according to 
3 Burch (1975) disputes this claim, arguing that Hume (at least in An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals) considers humility to be a passion, not 
a character trait. 
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Whitcomb et al., my humility consists primarily in recognizing that I’m not as 
physically strong as I might wish or that I am prone to certain errors in thinking 
that I might otherwise delude myself in denying. For this reason, their view of 
humility also falls in the low, accurate self-assessment category.
Another noteworthy variant of this view agrees that humility requires low 
self-assessment, but this self-assessment is mistaken. Te humble person 
underestimates herself. Spinoza, for example, appears to espouse an inaccurate, low 
self-assessment view of humility. First, to establish how a humble person views 
herself, Spinoza says, “Humility is pain arising from a man’s contemplation of his 
own weakness of body or mind” (E III, P 26). Te inaccuracy of this self-assessment 
becomes clear when we consider what, according to Spinoza, humility gives rise to.
We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self-
abasement, for as from self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs 
self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus defne: Self—abasement is thinking 
too meanly of one’s self by reason of pain (E III, P 28, Exp – P29). Te inaccuracy 
and pain are precisely why Spinoza then concludes that “humility is not a virtue” (E
IV, P 53). More recently, Driver calls modesty a virtue of ignorance, where “a modest 
person underestimates self-worth” (2004, p. 16). Tough her theory is purportedly 
about modesty, “humility is closely akin to modesty,” she notes (Driver, 2004, p. 
114).4 
2.3.2 Secondtheory: inattentive
More recently, an alternative conception of humility has begun to emerge.
It is distinct from the frst since it does not require one to regard oneself as lowly or 
limited. Rather, humility consists in being inattentive to one’s own status, i.e., not 
4 Driver does draw a distinction between humility and modesty. A humble 
person, she argues, can accurately assess his or her lowly state, while a modest 
person must underestimate her merit. 
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engaging in self-admiration of one’s merits or status or accomplishments because 
one does not spend much time thinking about oneself at all.
Te farthest back I have been able to trace this inattentive theory of humility 
is to Sidgwick’s Te Method of Ethics (1874). First, he considers the low self-
assessment view of humility—which he dubs the “common sense” view—and rejects 
it. “It seems, then, that the common account of Humility is erroneous” (1874, p. 312). 
We will return shortly to his reason for rejecting this view. For now, consider the 
conception of humility he offers instead. He writes,
Humility is regulative of two different impulses, one entirely self-
regarding and internal, the other relating to others and partly taking 
effect in social behaviour.Te internal duty relates, strictly speaking,
not to the opinions we form of ourselves (for here as in other 
opinions we ought to aim at nothing but Truth), but to the emotion 
of self-admiration, which springs naturally from the contemplation 
of our own merits, and as it is highly agreeable, prompts to such 
contemplation … . [T]he duty of Humility needs enforcing because 
most of us have a tendency to indulge this feeling [of self-
approbation] overmuch … Humility prescribes such repression of 
self-satisfaction 
(Sidgwick, 1874, pp. 312–313).
Humility, as Sidgwick understands it, is about limiting one’s sense of self-
satisfaction or self-admiration, regardless of one’s status or merit about which one 
could admire.
Since Sidgwick, the inattentive view has appeared to grow in popularity. C.
S. Lewis espoused it when he writes, [Te humble man] will not be thinking about 
humility: he will not be thinking about himself at all. If anyone would like to acquire 
humility, I can, I think, tell him the frst step.Te frst step is to realise that one is 
proud… If you think you are not conceited, it means you are very conceited indeed.
(Lewis, 1952, p. 71). More recently still, this view is endorsed by Tangney (2000), 
Roberts and Wood (2003, 2007), Garcia (2006), and Robinson and Alfano (2016). 
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Similarly, Nadelhoffer et al. assert, “[B]eing humble doesn’t require us to hold 
ourselves in low regard (or in a lower regard than is merited). Instead, humility 
merely requires us to avoid thinking too highly of ourselves” (2017, p. 10). They 
call this the “decentered and devoted” view of humility, the idea being that humble 
people are both not centered on themselves (and their own praiseworthiness) and 
also devoted to others. This second component is typically absent in the other 
inattentive views, which focus only not being centered on oneself. Whether 
devotion to others is a central component of humility or merely a very likely 
consequent of it remains an open question, but the key point is that a clear family 
resemblance between these views exists to warrant grouping them together despite 
underlying differences.
2.4 Resolving the paradoxes
Of these two different conceptions of virtue, my objective is not to reject one over 
the other. Christen, Alfano, and Robinson (2014, 2017) employ a psycholexical
method to analyze intellectual humility and fnd both conceptions in how a 
thesaurus tracks usage of the concept. Tis method is meant as a proxy for folk 
usage, indicating that it is common to understand and talk of humility in both ways.
Likewise, Alfano et al. (2017) developed and validated a psychological measure of 
intellectual humility that includes both views as different factors of the virtue.
Nevertheless, it can be fruitful to consider how each view handles the knot 
of prima facie paradoxes of humility previously discussed.Tis analysis is not meant 
to settle which of the two views is meant by “humility,” but rather which of the two 
is perhaps more conceptually robust by avoiding or resolving the paradoxes.
Of the two general views on humility, the inattentive view is better equipped
to handle each of these paradoxes. Sidgwick notes the shortcomings of the low self-
assessment account of humility. Just before laying out his explanation of humility as 
inattention, he writes,
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For it is generally said that Humility prescribes a low opinion of our 
own merits: but if our merits are comparatively high, it seems strange 
to direct us to have a low opinion of them. It may be replied, that 
though our merits may be high when compared with those of 
ordinary men, there are always some to be found superior, and we 
can compare ourselves with these, and in the extreme case with ideal 
excellence, of which all fall far short: and that we ought to make this 
kind of comparison and not the other kind, and contemplate our 
faults of which we shall assuredly fnd a sufficiency and not our 
merits. But surely in the most important deliberations which human 
life offers, in determining what kind of work we shall undertake and 
to what social functions we shall aspire, we must necessarily compare 
our qualifcations carefully with those of other men, if we are to 
decide rightly. And it would seem just as irrational to underrate 
ourselves as to overrate: and though most men are more prone to the 
latter mistake, there are certainly some rather inclined to the former.
(Sidgwick, 1874, p. 312)
Sidgwick is objecting to the low self-assessment account of humility as inherently 
paradoxical. What exactly he considers to be the problem with this view is hard to 
formulate precisely, but perhaps we can help him out now that we have more clearly 
delineated the different paradoxes of humility.Te central question is whether one’s 
humble self-assessment must be accurate or not. As we saw, various thinkers have 
advocated for two versions of the low self-assessment theory, where the low self-
assessment is either accurate or inaccurate. On the one hand, if one’s humble self-
assessment is (or must be) wrong—because one’s merits are actually “comparatively 
high”—then we run into the epistemic paradox. One’s belief, in this case, that one 
has low merits or status is false; therefore, one can never know that one has humility.
Sidgwick considers this “irrational” and detrimental, since we need accurate self-
assessment to determine what we should do with our lives and how to function in 
society. On the other hand, if one’s humble self-assessment is accurate, then we run 
into the axiological paradox. In this case, one’s self-assessment is correct, but it is 
unclear what is good or virtuous about being in and aware of this state. To these 
points, we can add an extra consideration Sidgwick does not address. Either way,
















Robinson – “I am SO Humble!” 13
the paradox of self-attribution still applies. If my self-assessment must be inaccurate 
to be true and I say that I am humble, then I have not inaccurately assessed my own 
meritorious character. Alternatively, if my self-assessment must be accurate to be 
true and I say that I am humble, then I am bragging about my lowliness.
Sidgwick was not alone in seeing trouble for the low self-attribution views.
Nadelhoffer et al. make a similar point when they remark, “One of the driving forces 
behind people’s unease about humility is the (we believe mistaken) assumption that 
being humble requires us to undervalue (even loathe) ourselves and underestimate 
our own capabilities” (2017, p. 8). Lewis, in his epistolary novel The Screwtape 
Letters (which contains letters from the demon Screwtape to the demon 
Wormwood tasked with tempting and corrupting an unnamed man), presents the 
problems thusly:
Your patient has become humble; have you drawn his attention to 
the fact? All virtues are less formidable to us once the man is aware 
that he has them, but this is specially true of humility. Catch him at 
the moment when he is really poor in spirit and smuggle into his 
mind the gratifying reflection, ‘By jove! I’m being humble,’ and 
almost immediately pride—pride at his own humility—will appear. 
If he awakes to the danger and tries to smother this new form of 
pride, make him proud of his attempt. 
(Lewis, 1942, p. 58)
In addition to expressing the paradoxical nature of the low self-assessment 
views of humility, this passage also points to how the inattentive view of humility 
can unravel the Gordian knot of paradoxes. The key is to begin with the epistemic 
paradox. We will assume that humility amounts to inattention to one’s merit. In 
that case, it is not impossible for a humble person to know that she is humble. Such 
a belief will not typically occur to her, so she will typically lack the occurrent belief 
that she is humble. Still, as Robinson and Alfano (2016) argue, she is disposed to 
believe (and know) that she is humble (since she is). This dispositional belief, 
however, rarely becomes occurent; it usually does not occur to her that she is
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humble. When this does occur to her, it typically is due to external prompting by a 
third party. A humble person does not typically spend much time considering her 
merit and praiseworthiness. If, for some reason, you are determined to convince her 
that she is humble and point to ample behavioral evidence of her humility, she can 
truthfully, occurrently believe and know that she is humble. But then she will 
quickly move on and go back to being merely disposed to believe she is humble 
(when told by others that she is). The paradox is resolved. The knowledge of one’s 
own humility is not impossible; it just rarely occurs.
From here, the self-attribution paradox follows the same path. If a humble 
person does not attend to her own humility (because she is typically only disposed 
to believe she is humble), then she will not say that she is humble. This is not to 
say she never can accurately attribute humility to herself. Again, if you go to great 
length to prove to her that she is humble, then she can reluctantly admit that she is 
humble without a paradox. As Robinson and Alfano (2016) point out, however, 
such self-attribution usually has to be first prompted by a third party. The main 
point though is that for the inattentive theory of humility, this paradox is resolved. 
It is not that a humble person cannot truthfully attribute humility to herself; it’s 
that she typically would not.
Two paradoxes down, three to go. The inculcation paradox raises the 
problem of how to train people to be humble. If they try to become humble, it 
would seem they would necessarily fail. This paradox, I think, remains the most 
problematic, but it is not intractable. Robinson and Alfano (2016) have considered 
this problem at length, drawing lessons from the Chinese virtue of wu-wei, which 
roughly translates as “dynamic, effortless, and unselfconscious state of mind of a 
person who is optimally active and effective” (Slingerland, 2014, p. 7). Almost by 
definition, one cannot try to achieve wu-wei, yet Confucian and Doaist thinkers 
developed several indirect strategies to achieve this virtuous state. In the same way, 
Robinson and Alfano (2016) argue part of the solution is to develop and promote 
rituals of demurring when praised by others and to encourage praising of others. 
Such rituals indirectly inculcate humility and simultaneously discourage false 
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modesty by making false modesty too costly to be worth the social benefit of 
seeming to be humble.
Regarding the agentic paradox, it is correct that one cannot intend to be 
humble, just as one cannot try act humbly, just as one cannot try to try. Indeed, 
trying to act humbly merely results in false modesty.5 This does not mean, however, 
that one therefore cannot act humbly. To act humbly, according to the inattentive 
account of humility, is to act in such a way that one does not attend to one’s own 
merit or praiseworthiness, especially when one easily could do so. Acting humbly is 
not something you do directly. Rather, you act humbly by not doing certain actions 
(e.g., boasting, showing off, or flexing) because you are doing something else 
instead, often some other-oriented action, such as praising or helping someone else.
Lastly, we can consider perhaps the most important of paradoxes of 
humility, the axiological paradoxes. Why is humility good? On the low self-
assessment view, we are forced to say one of three things: that it is good to have an 
accurate self-assessment of one’s lowly status, that it is good to falsely believe one 
has a low status, or humility is not good. The inattentive conception of humility 
offers a different, non-contradictory resolution to the paradox. Humility is good 
because it is the inattention to our own merit or status. If we are not paying 
attention to ourselves and our own praiseworthiness, we are freed up to pay 
attention to more morally important considerations, such as the needs or 
praiseworthiness of others.
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